Table of Contents

    • Notes on Contributors
    • 1    Moral and Epistemic Virtues    1
    • 2    The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good    13
    • 3    The Pursuit of Epistemic Good    29
    • 4    Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences    47
    • 5    Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered: A Reply to Eflin    67
    • 6    Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy    75
    • 7    Reply to Hookway    93
    • 8    The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue    101
    • 9    Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project    117
    • 10    Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism    130
    • 11    Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing    139
    • 12    Epistemic Injustice: The Third Way?    159
    • 13    Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging    163
    • 14    The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence    199
    • 15    Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck    210
    • 16    Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology    235
    • 17    Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise    258
    • Index    271