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What and How We Know and The truth is elusive
"Agnosticism and Christianity" in Essays Upon Some Controverted Questions (1892), pp. 350-1, 351-2.
The people who call themselves "Agnostics" have been charged with doing so because they have not the courage to declare themselves "Infidels." It has been insinuated that they have adopted a new name in order to escape the unpleasantness which attaches to their proper denomination. To this wholly erroneous imputation, I have replied by showing that the term "Agnostic" did, as a matter of fact, arise in a manner which negatives it; and my statement has not been, and can not be, refuted. Moreover, speaking for myself, and without impugning the right of any other person to use the term in another sense, I further say that Agnosticism is not properly described as a "negative" creed, nor indeed as a creed of any kind, except in so far as it expresses absolute faith in the validity of a principle, which is as much ethical as intellectual. This principle may be stated in various ways, but they all amount to this: that it is wrong for a man to say that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty. This is what Agnosticism asserts; and, in my opinion, it is all that is essential to Agnosticism. That which Agnostics deny and repudiate, as immoral, is the contrary doctrine, that there are propositions which men ought to believe, without logically satisfactory evidence; and that reprobation ought to attach to the profession of disbelief in such inadequately supported propositions. The justification of the Agnostic principle lies in the success which follows upon its application, whether in the field of natural, or in that of civil, history; and in the fact that, so far as these topics are concerned, no sane man thinks of denying its validity.
Thomas Nagel on Skepticism said...
The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 115-6.
Suppose you become convinced that all your choices, decisions, and
conclusions were determined by rationally arbitrary features of your
psychological makeup or by external manipulation, and then tried to ask
yourself what, in the light of this information, you should do or
believe. There would really be no way to answer the question. Because
the arbitrary causal control of which you had become convinced would
apply to whatever you said or decided. You could not simultaneously
believe this about yourself and try to make a free, rational choice.
Not only that, but if the very belief in the causal system of control
was itself a product of what you thought to be reasoning, then it too
would lose its status as a belief freely arrived at, and your attitude
toward it would have to change. ¶ Doubt about your own rationality is
unstable; it leaves you really with nothing to think. So although the
hypothesis of nonrational control seems a contingent possibility, it is
no more possible to entertain it with regard to yourself than it is to
consider the possibility that you are not thinking. I have never known
how to respond to this conundrum.
John Owen on Human Finitude said...
Evenings with the Skeptics: Free Discussion on Free thinkers, Vol. II: Christian Skepticism (Longmans, Green & Co: 1881), p.13.
Although thinkers in the present day are
taught to regard their minds as the products of that omnipotent
evolution that has educed the whole of natural phenomena, metaphysical
as well as physical, from primæval chaos, there seems still loft ... an
ineradicable instinct to assign it ... an independence and autonomy of
its own. Probably there never existed a race so rude as not to possess
some power of discriminating between the subjective thought and
objective being, between the 'ego' and the 'non-ego.' Thus in man's
most rudimentary relation to the outer world there is postulated a
dualism. No sooner does he begin to think than he recognises himself as
an entity disparate from and even partially opposed to the environment
in which he lives. ... He begins to find that just as he himself forms
an infinitesimally small part of the
universe, so his personal knowledge is utterly incommensurate with the
sum-total of existence, which nevertheless it would fain fathom ... The
thinker rightly regards himself and his knowledge as a
small islet in the immeasurable ocean of the unknown. Moreover, this
conviction of disparity tends to advance with the progress of
knowledge. Every extension of the bounds of the universe, whether in
space or time, enlarges the limits of human Nescience, and the
philosopher is fain to confess, "What I know is a small part of what
might be known" ... Gradually man acquires the
conviction that the known can never be an adequate measure of the
unknown. Indeed the assertion of an inevitable antinomy between man and
the universe is no more than the involuntary homage we are compelled to
render to the infinite possibilities by which we are surrounded, and so
far 'twofold truth' might conceivably claim to be the erection of an
altar to the unknown god. ~ An Excerpt
A Treatise on Human Understanding (Clarendon Press, 1896).
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those who
pretend to discover any thing new to the world in philosophy
and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their
own systems by decrying all those which have been advanced
before them. And indeed were they content with
lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the
most important questions that can come before the tribunal
of human reason, there are few who have an acquaintance
with the sciences that would not readily agree with them. 'Tis easy for one of judgment and learning to perceive
the weak foundation even of those systems which have obtained
the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions
highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles
taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them,
want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole,
these are every where to be met with in the systems of the
most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace
upon philosophy itself.
The Great Divorce (Simon & Schuster: 1946), 44.
I can promise you none of these things. No atmosphere of inquiry, for I
will bring you to the land not of questions but of answers, and you
shall see the face of God. "Ah, but we must all interpret those
beautiful words in our own way! For me there is no such thing as a
final answer. The free wind of inquiry must always continue to blow
through the mind, must it not? Prove all things, to travel hopeful is
better than to arrive." If that were true, and known to be true, how
could anyone travel hopefully? There would be nothing to hope for. "But
you must feel yourself that there is something stifling about the idea
of finality? Stagnation, my dear boy, what is more soul-destroying than
stagnation?" You think that, because hitherto you have experienced
truth only with the abstract intellect. I will bring you where you can
taste it like honey and be embraced by it as by a bridegroom. Your
thirst shall be quenched.
