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Faith and/or Reason
- Metaphilosophy (3)
- Reason & Logic (22)
- Apologetics (22) : Making the Case for Faith
- Doubt (21) : Cognitive Dissonance
- Miracles (7) : Possibility of Miracles
- Confessions (3) : Why/What I believe
Brennan Manning on Faith said...
The Ragamuffin Gospel, (Questar Publishers, 1993), 54.
The scribes were treated with excessive deference in Jewish society because of their education and learning. Everyone honored them because of their wisdom and intelligence. The "mere children"(napioi in Greek, really meaning babes) were Jesus' image for the uneducated and ignorant. He is saying that the gospel of grace has been disclose to and grasped by the uneducated and ignorant instead of the learned and wise. For this Jesus thanks God... The babes (napioi) are in the same state as the children (paidia). God's grace falls on them because they are negligible creatures, not because of their good qualities. They may be aware of their worthlessness, but this is not the reason revelations are given to them. Jesus expressly attributes their good fortune to the Father's good pleasure, the divine eudokia. The gifts are not determined by the slightest personal quality or virtue. They were pure liberality. Once and for all, Jesus deals the death blow to any distinction between the elite and the ordinary in the Christian community.
Thomas Nagel on Rationalization said...
The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 130.
The ordinary charge of "rationalization," like the exposure of errors in reasoning, does not question the claims of reason itself but rather presupposes them. It contrasts the sources of belief in this case with an alternative type of ground that would actually justify them, or demonstrate their truth.
The Soul of Science (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994), p. 154-5.
Throughout the academic world, non-Euclidean geometry was invoked to
support a positivistic, anti-metaphysical temper of thought. A culture
was assumed to be analogous to a geometry. Both were built on a few
postulates chosen from an indefinite number of possibilities; both
consisted of internally consistent, interrelated wholes; and both were
immune to judgements about their truth or falsity in any ultimate
sense. Just as different geometries could all be logically valid, it
was argued, so any number of different cultural and ethical systems
could all be logically valid. Thus non-Euclideanism became a metaphor
for the rejection of all traditional deductive systems — particularly
the moral and religious tradition of Christianity. This is not to say
that non-Euclideanism is intrinsically anti-Christian or
anti-religious. Yet it was invoked as a symbol to deny that
Christianity has any claim to a superior or exclusive truth.
From The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter XV
The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very
uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through
life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the
habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which
have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his
deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite,
finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar
possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to
philosophize, on the contrary, we find... that even the most everyday
things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be
given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the
true answer to the doubts it raises, is able to suggest many
possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny
of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what
things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be;
it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never
traveled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our
sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.
Critique of Pure Reason
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its
knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very
nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as
transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.
Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (Houghton Mifflin: 1995) p. 202.
If one kept (as rock-bottom reality) the universe of the senses, aided by instruments and co-ordinated so as to form "science," then one would have to go much further — as many have since gone — and adopt a Behavioristic theory of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. But such a theory was, and is, unbelievable to me. I am using the word "unbelievable," which many use to mean "improbable" or even "undesirable," in a quite literal sense. I mean that the act of believing what the behaviorist believes is one that my mind simply will not perform. I cannot force my thought into that shape any more than I can scratch my ear with my big toe or pour wine out of a bottle into the cavity at the base of that same bottle. It is as final as a physical impossibility.
Joe Firmage on Faith said...
"Dear Harper", in Forbes ASAP, October 2, 2000.
I hope you'll be interested to know that I — near the start of a new millennium and at the age of 67 — am still able to believe, with no serious effort, that the entire universe was willed into being by an unsurpassed power whom most human beings call God. I believe that God remains conscious of his creation and interested in it. I believe that his interest may be described, intermittently at least, as love (and I say "his" with no strong suspicion that he shares qualities with the earthly male gender).
MA Philosophy Newsletter, Talbot School of Theology (Issue V, Fall 2000)
As a disciple, the Christian philosopher is enthralled with Jesus, he trusts Him, and wants everthing in his life to enhance Jesus' reputation among the nations. The Christian is here primarly to serve a Name, not to make a name and the disciple recognizes that in Jesus all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge reside.
Reasoning Practically (Oxford University Press: 2000), p. 76.
Given my focus on practical rather than theoretical reasoning, I may at this point consider weakening the principle of total evidence and examining a presumption instead. The presumption to be examined establishes, for purposes of rational action, a generic bias in favor of more knowledge rather than on less. To defend the adoption of the presumption in favor of being maximally informed amounts to defending the belief that following it will lead, in the long run, to better overall results, in terms of goal fulfillment, than the results of following its antithesis (i.e., a presumption establishing a generic bias in favor of acting on the basis of less knowledge rather than on more), or indeed better than the results of a case-by-case balancing (i.e., of following no rule or presumption at all).
Kim Walker on Loss of Faith said...
"Atheism in the Third Millenium", The Secular Web
It's a familiar story now. Young Christian was born into a God-fearing household. He learned to read from an illustrated children's Bible (one of those with the sex and nastiness carefully bowdlerised). He went to a Christian school. He joined a Christian group in college. He got into an argument with an atheist and found his knowledge of the Bible wanting. He set out to study the Bible in greater depth, so he could answer the atheist's objections all the better. He found the Bible hopelessly flawed and suffered a crisis of faith. He went to his church so his faith might be restored, but found no convincing answers for his questions. He left the church, convinced that there was something wrong with him, which made him unable to believe and left him eternally damned. He discovered that there was life after religion, and that it wasn't all bad, and that there are more things in heaven and earth than his priest ever told him about. Now he calls himself an atheist.
